ABSTRACT

Introduction The study of IR has the potential for acquisition and growth of genuine knowledge, at least in some issue-areas. Progress of this type requires the resolution of disagreements between disputing schools of thought. Disagreements often stem from differences over empirical evidence and theoretical principles; but they can arise also at the meta-theoretical level – over selecting the right criteria of theory choice or the proper form of a social science explanation. Only when the locus of the differences are identified can the disputants then focus debate on the issues that divide them, engage opponents’ arguments rather than talk past one another, and work toward showing more persuasively that their preferred conclusion is superior. The discussion that follows argues intellectual progress in finding best explanations requires both careful attention to the criteria of theory-choice (H-Conv) and unfettered criticism of methodological principles (H-Plur). The chapter builds on three premises that I have supported in other published works. Premise 1. Many forms of inquiry are legitimate. IR is an interdisciplinary field and, for that reason, there is a range of types of question that scholars in the field ask, including empirical, meaning-intepretive, causal, theoreticalexplanatory, moral, etc. I have argued in The Power of International Theory (2005) and elsewhere (e.g., 2007b) that the diversity of questions justifies a range of legitimate and appropriate methods of argument, including empirical, interpretivist-constructivist, moral-evaluative, and philosophico-meta-theoretical. The appropriate method or combination of methods depends on the precise nature of the question at issue. It might be added that, because The Power of International Theory was written in a period in which empiricist theorizing was the subject of a sustained interpretivist-constructivist assault, often supposedly bolstered by meta-theoretical principles of scientific or critical realism (Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1999; Patomäki and Wight, 2000a), much of the book shows how those foundational criticisms miss their mark and how empirical methods, when applied to a particular range of IR questions, are at least as legitimate as constructivist or other approaches.