ABSTRACT
The previous chapters stand as a defense of infallibilism about what one is occurrently thinking, so to address issues about Wayward Reflection. Yet throughout the book, “thinking” that p just means something like “entering some mental state or other with a p-content”—it does not require any specific attitude toward that content. Consequently, knowing that you think that p is not sufficient to know whether you believe that p, rather than deny that p or suspend judgment on whether p. Reflective inquiry, however, seems to require knowing which attitude you take toward a proposition. This was mentioned at the end of the previous chapter; however, to illustrate further: If q is incompatible with p, then in the reflective process q may be thereby disconfirmed, but only if I presently believe p. If I instead suspend judgment on p, then q is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by p. Thus, deciding the evidential status of some propositions depends on my knowing (in some way) what my attitude is toward them. (See chapter 11, section 1, for more details on this kind of line.)
Thus, it is not enough for rational reflection just to know what you think. Normally it is also required to know which attitude attends the thought. This chapter is a first step toward showing that, in a range of cases, we indeed know our attitudes. Its ambition is to justify that under some circumstances, we are in fact infallible about our attitude toward an occurrent thought. But: It takes more to explain how one can recognize an attitude-attribution as infallible. It also takes further argument (thanks to the complexities of knowing-wh) to show that you thereby know which attitude you have toward a thought. These two matters shall be taken up separately in chapters 8 and 10, after the core infallibility thesis is established in this one.
