ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Strawson's basic argument by labeling it an impossibilist version of the Ultimacy Argument. Tamler Sommer's irrealist contention is that no theory about moral responsibility is true. Baruch Spinoza maintained that it is due to the truth of causal determinism that they lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. By contrast with Spinoza and Honderich, many contemporary free will skeptics are agnostic about causal determinism, but contend that free will skepticism is reasonable on either deterministic or indeterministic presuppositions. Incompatibilists would not regard the control required for moral responsibility in these senses to be incompatible with determinism, and thus it is open to free will skeptics to endorse these senses. In recent decades, certain neuroscientific studies conducted by scientists such as Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner have been taken to demonstrate that they lack free will. Levy contends that the case for free will skepticism can be made on both determinist and the indeterminist alternatives.
