ABSTRACT
ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Nonaggression (PNA) in 1978 and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD) in 1981, which altered its institutional characteristic significantly. The origin of these protocols dates back to November 5, 1976, when member states discussed security regulations and considered the adoption of an “annexed protocol on non-recourse to force” (ECOWAS 1990a, 197-200). This discussion led the majority of member states to reach a consensus that maintaining stability took precedence over economic development, the latter of which could not be attained without
“an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States of the Community” (ECOWAS 1990a, 197-200). The PNA had certain unique characteristics. Given that internal stability was the primary concern of African security, the PNA regulated intra-ECOWAS relations by prohibiting the means to engage in conflict, particularly subversion. The regulation of member states’ behavior is governed by Articles 1 and 5 of the PNA, which are similar to a conventional nonaggression pact; that is, they prohibit the threat or use of force against states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty and espouse the principle of peaceful means to settle disputes. In addition, Article 2 of the PNA created the regulation to prohibit subversion among member states; Article 3 requested that member states prevent “foreigners resident on [member states’] territory from committing acts of subversion”; and Article 4 obligated member states to prevent nonresident foreigners from using the member states’ respective territories as bases for subversion.2 As such, the protocol aimed to prevent conflicts among and within member states; in essence, member states created a conflict prevention arrangement through institutional layering. Soon after the PNA was adopted, member states further developed ECOWAS’s security utility by adopting the PMAD on May 29, 1981. The PMAD aimed to achieve three additional objectives: to prevent and respond to external aggression; to manage intra-ECOWAS conflicts; and to counter internal armed conflicts harbored by external agents, including nonmember states (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 9-11).3 In the event of external aggression, member states would provide mutual aid and assistance to defend against such aggression. Moreover, the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC)—which was envisaged as ECOWAS’s intervention force-was created by combining member states’ national forces and was commanded by the authorization of the Authority (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 11). To this end, the Authority was mandated to regularly assess the security situation in West Africa through annual meetings and extraordinary sessions (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 10). For intraECOWAS conflicts, the Authority would initially play the role of mediator and, if necessary, would employ the AAFC to not punish, but intercede between troops. Also, the PMAD aimed to create two new defense organs: the Defense Council and the Defense Commission. The former comprised the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of member states, and its function was to prepare an agenda on defense and security matters and to examine security situations in times of crisis (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 10). The latter was responsible for examining technical issues (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 10). Therefore, the PMAD established new security functions that aimed to address both intra-and extra-institutional security through the potential deployment of the AAFC. Given that the AAFC would be employed to terminate conflicts among member states if mediation efforts failed, ECOWAS had assumed the characteristics of a nontraditional collective security arrangement seeking to prevent conflict and subversion among member states. Specifically, the AAFC was allowed to intervene in armed conflicts among member states if the
Authority reached a consensus. In addition, two provisions of the protocol afforded ECOWAS the characteristics of a collective self-defense arrangement: first, the institution would respond to interstate conflicts between member states and nonmember states and second, it would respond to internal armed conflicts supported by external actors. In each case, member states would provide defense assistance, including the AAFC, to the affected member state.4 Through institutional layering, thus, the PMAD served as both a nontraditional collective security arrangement and a collective self-defense arrangement. This section examines the two institutional changes in the period of 1976-1981 described above, focusing in particular on the regional distribution of power in West Africa, member states’ assessment of the security utility of ECOWAS, and the internal discussion that led to the development of ECOWAS’s new ISP.
