ABSTRACT

Practice theoretical approaches distance themselves both from subjectivist and objectivist explanations of the social in an effort to locate a third road less travelled between methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. By means of a ‘praxeologisation of the social’ (Schmidt 2012: 28-50) it can be demonstrated empirically how social orders are practically produced, maintained, and changed in the interplay of diverse human and non-human participants (see Koddenbrock, Chapter 7 of this volume). This entails conceiving of the subject in a ‘thin’ manner without, however, viewing subjectivity merely as a structural effect of a pre-existing social order. Thus, with its strong conception of practice, the theory is not founded upon an intentional and autonomous subject that is viewed as a pre-practical origin of agency. Rather, praxeological approaches presume that subjects arise through the incorporation of bodies in social practices. Therefore, the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ lose their status as fundamental concepts of theory and become its subject matter as part of symbolicmaterial culture: it becomes a matter of empirical research what the subject is and what analytical descriptive value is gained with this term for societal selfobservation (Nassehi 2012). Subsequently, the subject no longer exists in the singular form, but rather exclusively in the plural as an agent that is required to accustom itself to field-and practice-specific ‘subject forms’ (Reckwitz 2006: 34-50) and to call upon and perform them in action. The social existence and intelligibility of an agent as an identifiable subject unfolds performatively through the accomplishment of practices. Thus, to explain how social order arises, practice theories utilise neither the interplay of the intentional acts of autonomous subjects nor structures or discourses located ‘behind them’ (Reckwitz 2003), but rather look to the embodied accomplishment of practices through which a social order and its subjects are performed and, thus, come into being. By doing so practices themselves are seen as a medium of meaning, knowledge, and intentionality and it is not until their performance that subjects become apparent as carriers of specific competences and capabilities. By dissolving the purportedly universal self-reflexive subject into historically specific practice complexes (Reckwitz 2003: 296), practice theories emphasise

that the classical assumption of autonomous and critical rationality is faced with its limits when confronted with the irreducible embodied and material mediation of thinking and action (Alkemeyer et al. 2015). However, they have avoided discussion of how reflexive competences and critical rationality, hitherto seen in connection with a classical conception of subjectivity, can be reconceptualised in a productive manner within this new paradigm. In order to reach such a reconceptualisation of subjectivity it would be necessary to confront the radically dissolved subject concept with a mode of analysis that allows for a renewed focus on capacities regarding reflection and critique traditionally associated with a strong subject, but without letting the insight into the societal and historical formation of subjectivity in relation to specific practices be pushed out of focus. Starting from these considerations, this chapter inquires how social order and its subjects reciprocally constitute each other through contingently accomplished practices and mould themselves into an intelligible form. First, by analytically differentiating ‘praxis’ and ‘practices’ we put forward a methodical-systematic change of perspective. In doing this we will sketch out the reciprocal constitutional relationship of social orders and their participants. By demonstrating how participants continuously position each other and are positioned through reciprocal addressing we then show how, within this process of positioning, room to manoeuvre regarding heterogeneous interpretations, expectations, and intentions inevitably arises. This analytical framework then serves as a further step in examining the development of subjectivity by means of the abilities required for it. Lastly, we consider the innovative potential of this framework for the sociopolitical analysis of power and critique.1