ABSTRACT
Social theory evinces multiple ontologies. By ‘multiple ontologies’ I mean multiple specifications of the basic elements, structure, or nature of social life. I do not mean disparate realities produced in different practices (e.g. Mol 2002; Law and Lien 2013). The ontologies I have in mind are theoretical, conceptual, mostly explicit, and produced by thinkers in academic practices. By contrast, multiple ontologies à la Mol and Law are hybrid discursive-material-actional entities, unevenly put into words, and produced in many if not most practices. All intellectual endeavours with a theoretical dimension accommodate multiple, competing theories, which different groups of practitioners promulgate. Disciplines differ, however, regarding the acceptability of plurality. Although, for instance, the natural sciences welcome multiple theories in the search for truth, they seek to reduce and expunge this multiplicity. They accomplish this by submitting theories to tests, the results of which bear on whether the theories should be retained. In modern art, by contrast, theories (like ideas) inspire and motivate: artworks are sometimes produced in their spirit, or to illustrate or realise them, or in their service. In most cases at least, artworks do not confirm or disconfirm the theories or ideas that inform them: the arts do not worry about the multiplicity of theories or ideas that their works illustrate or instantiate. Somewhere between the natural sciences and the arts lie the social disciplines. These disciplines exhibit a significant theoretical dimension. Largely depending on discipline and training, the attitudes of social investigators towards multiple theories lean toward those dominant in either the sciences or the arts. In the US, in disciplines such as economics and political science, practitioners generally believe that only one (possibly large conjunctive) theory can be right about a particular topic. This attitude reflects the fact that many researchers in these disciplines have a more natural science-like sense of what theories are: law-like or modelic explanatory devices (hypotheses also qualify as theories in these disciplines). In these disciplines, ontologies subsist mostly sotto voce, and one category of ontology rules: individualism. Other social disciplines including sociology, geography, anthropology, education, and science and technology studies often concur with economics and political science that only one explanatory theory can be correct. These disciplines, however, lean more towards the arts regarding ontology. They are attentive to ontology and ecumenical about
competing ones. They teach graduate students that what matters is clarity about one’s ontology (or theory) and a clear articulation of it, for instance, in the theory chapter of the dissertation – even as the relation of this ontology to the remainder of one’s work, e.g. the following chapters, is often obscure or goes undiscussed. In disciplines such as sociology and geography, multiple ontologies overtly vie and are disputed. These disciplines usually applaud this multiplicity or are indifferent to it and occasionally unsure about what to make of it. I share this uncertainty. I have often wondered how scholars should proceed in the face of such multiplicity. Is it arbitrary which ontology an investigator employs? Are some ontologies more legitimate or cogent than others? Is it simply up to each scholar to determine which to use? Is her choice, if she chooses, the product of training, personality, influential mentors or scholars, and the like? Is any ontology that makes sense to a scholar or that helps a scholar accomplish her research a good one? Moreover, can ontologies be combined? Do ontologies place constraints on what other theories an investigator can utilise? The current chapter makes a start in addressing these issues. Although my discussion focuses on ontologies of the practice variety, some of what I write necessarily addresses ontologies more broadly or theories even more broadly. Indeed, the entire discussion has wider application. My principal contention is that just any ontology is not OK and that real constraints exist on acceptable ones. More specifically, I will argue that two general criteria exist for judging the goodness of ontologies and that it is incumbent on students of social life to utilise them. Along the way, the issue of incompatible ontologies will arise, and I will say something about combining practice ontologies with theories of other sorts. As I will explain, ontologies place considerable constraints on what other theories or sorts of theory are compatible with them. Advocating a practice ontology limits what nonpractice theories a researcher can – at least consistently – take up.
