ABSTRACT
On May 1, 2004, the European Union expanded its membership from fifteen to twenty-five countries, welcoming eight East European countries previously under the sphere of Soviet influence, as well as Cyprus and Malta. Since the fall of communism in 1989, many of these countries had declared their desire to “return to Europe” as EU members. For some, enlargement was a moral opportunity to mend the historical division of the European continent after World War II, while for others this was an economic opportunity for these countries to participate in the European common market. Inspired by the work of Charles Tilly and others, this chapter analyzes EU enlargement as a structure of economic opportunities for prospective members. It argues against a cost-benefit analysis of enlargement based on presumed economic interests and analyzes the impact of bargaining upon prospective members seeking to join the European Union. It considers an analogy between one of the features of political opportunity structures, repression, and conditionality to explain the mechanism by which the European Union exerts influence upon countries seeking to become members. It analyzes opportunities for direct funds through the European Union’s regional policies and highlights changes in policies and institutions to meet the demands of accession.
