ABSTRACT
Deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism and terrorism together with rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former violent radicals have gained worldwide attention after the 9/11 attacks. Programs aiming to achieve some form of commitment reduction to violent extremist groups for their participants have been created in more than 40 countries. Many different types of deradicalization programs have been developed by governmental and non-governmental actors and various approaches to reach the designated target group have been implemented. According to the local political and legal contexts, these programs do share a number of essential similarities, despite many differences. Especially regarding the standard tools and methods employed to foster individual physical and psychological change processes, these programs have displayed a wide consensus. Nevertheless, academic studies about individual deradicalization processes and the programs aiming to create that change have been scarce. Deradicalization remains one of the most under-researched fields, which is even more surprising, as the connection to successful counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and counterradicalization policies is obvious. For the most part, research on terrorism, political violence, and related fields (e.g., violent youth gangs, criminology, New Religious Movements) has concentrated on the development or onset of deviant and criminal behavior, instead of solutions or routes out. Therefore, empirically based research on the mechanisms and pathways out of violent extremism will be key in future terrorism research to provide a solid base for practical programs aiming to reintegrate former terrorists. This study offers insights into theoretical and practical aspects of deradicalization work based on an intensive review of existing research, the author’s own practical experiences as a deradicalization counselor, more than 50 interviews with former right-wing extremists, and in-depth case studies of reintegration and disengagement programs around the world. In this way, a unique combination of theoretical models and practice-focused methods has been developed, which-in contrast to other academic studies in this field-was tested and refined in deradicalization work undertaken globally by the author. Nevertheless, deradicalization remains a context-bound activity and there are ‘no-one-size-fits-all’ solutions. Policy makers and practitioners need to
establish those models that work best in the given political and legal landscapes. These locally adapted models can and should be based on thorough understanding of radicalization and deradicalization mechanisms, as well as quality standards that have proven themselves to be essential in effective programs. ‘Effectiveness’ in deradicalization will, of course, remain one of the most contested terms connected to that field. While it is the author’s strong belief that deradicalization programs can be highly effective counter-terrorism tools, evaluation of these programs has been poor globally, to say the least. Virtually no deradicalization program-with very few notable exceptions-has undergone any scientific evaluation to show positive effects or lack of success. This is contrasted with the unanimous claim of highest ‘success rates’—in terms of recidivism rates-by nearly every known deradicalization program around the world. Even though the base rates for terrorist recidivism after release from prison are not established, some studies have suggested that these rates are significantly lower when compared with ‘ordinary’ crime (e.g., Silke, 2014). Hence, these success claims of deradicalization programs can theoretically be the natural result of normally low recidivism rates in terrorism. One essential lesson learned in the present study is that different types of deradicalization programs exist with differing strengths and weaknesses. Based on the programs’ actors (governmental, non-governmental), role of ideology (included or not included), and contact approach (active, passive), these types-detailed in Chapter 5-are essential to understanding the best fitting target groups, risks, practical difficulties, and expectations for success. Governmental active programs with counter-ideological approaches, for example, have a naturally higher rate of expected failure (participation abandonment, recidivism) than those programs based on voluntary participation and with a subtler approach to tackling the extremist ideology. In general, programs around the world most commonly deploy a mixture of psychological counseling, mentoring, vocational training, education, and techniques designed to help build self-awareness and positive identities. It is seen as crucial that programs also provide post-graduation monitoring and economic reintegration assistance, even though this aspect is strongly constrained by the available resources and political contexts. Another key lesson of this study is, that deradicalization programs-if built on strong quality standards and specialized staff training-can be highly effective counter-terrorism tools. Some specific effects in the field of counter-terrorism are, for example, the disruption of group hierarchies, insights into recruitment processes, availability of strong and credible counter-narratives (through the voices of former extremists), as well as creation of doubt within extremist milieus. However, these effects cannot be generalized and depend on many aspects, such as the program type, the target group, and the way deradicalization work is conducted. Some large international terrorist groups might be used to a high rate of turnover and government-run programs might be disregarded as non-credible.
