ABSTRACT
Throughout this monograph it has become clear that one of the most severe problems faced by all deradicalization programs is the question of how to show and ensure a positive impact according to the programs’ goals. Many additional aspects connected to this issue-such as, for example, if there should be common working standards, how to evaluate deradicalization programs’ performance, and how to effectively structure or design these programs-have been briefly touched upon in the existing literature so far. However, attempts to suggest comprehensive evaluation tools for deradicalization programs coming from academia (e.g., Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Romaniuk & Fink, 2012; Williams & Kleinman, 2013) have almost completely failed to take root in practice. While the field of rehabilitation programs for ordinary criminals has experienced a high level of standardization and the development of extensive evaluation tools, deradicalization programs have struggled to demonstrate their impact or sometimes even actively blocked access for external researchers or requests for more information and transparency. This is partially due to the fact that many programs are operated by security agencies, involve a target group deemed to be highly dangerous to their surrounding countries, and sometimes utilize questionable methods, as well as political and tactical motives. Nevertheless, without the development of methods to evaluate deradicalization and terrorist rehabilitation programs, comprehensive ethical and professional standards, or widely accepted norms regarding operational aspects of these initiatives, the field is inevitably bound to remain fragmented, confronted with suspected inefficiencies, failure, or misconduct. As well, the theoretical and partially demonstrated potential of deradicalization programs in counter-terrorism will not be fully realized. Akin to any other complex social problem, terrorism and counter-radicalization must be subjected to scrutiny to avoid backlash or waste of resources. Governments, practitioners, and researchers need to be able to compare and differentiate programs according to their type, goals, and methods, but also on their impact, proficiency, and skills, in order to develop true ‘best practices,’ develop and build new programs based on well-established principles, and improve existing programs regarding identified mistakes or insufficiencies. As pointed out by some of the
leading experts in the field, ‘best practice’ can only apply to a method or technique with proven success in implementation, in addition to being transferrable and having a demonstrated superiority over other approaches (quoted in Susan, 2012, p. 82). As a consequence of these high demands regarding the label ‘best practice,’ one can show that-similar to the field of DDR programs and research-popular use of this term applied to many different programs without any significant evaluation or concept behind them has resulted in a strong devaluation and inflated application of such quality statements. While there is no shortage of ‘best practice’ collections in deradicalization, almost none of the programs have actually displayed any proven success, much less superiority over other approaches, or the possibility of transfer to other countries. Of course, it would be naïve to propose that a ‘one size fits all’ solution could be developed for every country, target group, and context. Differences in political cultures, ideologies, structure of terrorist groups, legal frameworks, religion, and available resources need to be incorporated into every program design. Sometimes the transfer of one specific program from one community to another in the same country can prove to be highly problematic, as, for example, with the Danish “Aarhus” approach (Agerschou, 2014). Depending on whether, or to what degree, the design of the program is context-specific, it might even be entirely impossible to try to copy the approach elsewhere. Other program designs have been used as role models across the world, such as the British “Channel” program (Robertson, 2015). In general, one needs to differentiate between the types of deradicalization programs, the political context, and the goals of each initiative (see Chapter 8 for a comprehensive typology). Although governmental programs have been deemed to be relatively easier to transfer, this only applies to the political-social context sharing similar traditions or main elements, such as the British “Channel” project, and the sharing of the British legal and political infrastructure with Canadian, US, or Dutch partners. Another example would be the Saudi Arabian or Singaporean deradicalization programs, which have acted as role models for rehabilitation programs in Malaysia or Indonesia. Civil society based deradicalization programs have experienced more difficulties regarding the possibility of transfer to other countries, as they have been traditionally seen as more context specific, although ‘front line’ practitioners from non-governmental programs have acted as expert advisors to governments. While nongovernmental programs have inspired other civil society based initiatives and vice versa, with governmental approaches inspiring other governments, a similar rough rift exists between Western and Middle Eastern/Southeast Asian approaches. Only marginal cross-cultural exchange exists between these two socio-political areas. This chapter will discuss several key questions related to evaluation, standards, and impact assessment of deradicalization programs. Many of these have already been extensively discussed in other fields, such as DDR or criminology, for rehabilitation programs focusing on ‘ordinary’ criminals. Hence, the
possibility of translating that knowledge to the field of deradicalization will be scrutinized. This translation has partially been suggested by other studies in the past (e.g., Mullins, 2010), without a detailed theoretical test of application based on in-depth field studies and practical perspectives of deradicalization work. Indeed, how the ‘impact’ of deradicalization programs is defined and measured to ensure quality for these initiatives needs to be discussed. Paradoxically, the majority of programs have not included clearly defined goals and impact measures, which directly refers to the questions of which quantitative or qualitative metrics or factors should be used to assess a program’s effect. Organizational aspects are equally important. As, so far, no comprehensive typology of programs besides the one suggested in Chapter 8 exists in the literature, a discussion of important elements in program design similarly does not exist, which could be used to establish effective standards and comparison methods. The possible impact of criminological research on effective rehabilitation programs of non-political or religious offenders might prove especially useful. Nevertheless, it needs to be discussed what specific requirements must be placed on the staff of deradicalization programs, if there are any genuine to that field. Finally, several methods for evaluation of deradicalization and disengagement programs will be introduced and analyzed regarding their practical applicability. In addition, some rare cases of ethical misconduct by DDPs will be scrutinized, in order to highlight the necessity of standards and high quality evaluations.
