ABSTRACT
As outlined above, deradicalization programs have been praised many times as very important tools with which to fight terrorism and radicalization, as well as proving a core element of democratic and pluralistic societies: the individual ability to change and re-enter a peaceful life. However, deradicalization programs have also been criticized heavily due to lack of transparency and scientific evaluations, inefficiencies in their work, unproven success and other structural insufficiencies (e.g., see Horgan & Braddock, 2010). This critique will be treated in detail in other chapters (e.g., Chapters 9 and 11), while the following chapter looks at another critical aspect regarding the main idea behind deradicalization itself, although mostly relevant for programs working in Western or democratic countries. Leaving aside ‘disengagement’ for a moment, the idea and philosophy behind ‘deradicalization’ programs is built upon the notion of individual attitudinal change (political or religious) fostered or guided by an external party. However structured and framed this external intervention might be, in Western democratic political philosophy this core idea infringes upon the guaranteed rights of individual freedom of political thought and religion, as many intervention programs focus their work on the so-called ‘pre-criminal’ or ‘non-criminal’ space. Thus, it has been argued that deradicalization programs, especially state-run programs, are, in essence, illegitimate attempts to undermine these freedoms in favor of more or less arbitrary mainstream or ‘government sanctioned’ politics and religious views. As well, these efforts have been seen as naïve attempts to create cultural or moral relativism, erasing any differences between values and perspectives (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009, p. 393). These structured programs aiming to change individual political and religious beliefs, despite a high degree of variance between Western countries regarding the legitimacy of governmental intervention in individual life in general, have at least raised suspicions and scepticism among populations and civil rights advocacy groups. In consequence, many Western programs (governmental and non-governmental) have been very careful not to include an ideological component in their work or reframe this component as attitudinally focused. Danish prison-based disengagement programs, for example, deliberately forbid their case managers to ask specific questions that could be
considered to infringe the mentee’s personal political opinion during the mentoring. Most Western programs working in this field are therefore focusing on ‘disengagement,’ trying to avoid critique. In addition, the role and importance of ideology as such for the radicalization and exit process is debated and seen differently in Western political cultures. In order to solve this practical problem, state-run programs usually refer to the main criterion of legality/illegality to determine their legitimate sphere of action. Whenever individuals engage in illegal action, government programs, according to this view, can and should legitimately assist the person to return to a legal way of life or desist from criminal behavior. Leaving aside most parts of ideology (which in Western countries traditionally belongs to the protected sphere of freedom of thought and religion), this approach naturally tends to work on a rather late stage of radicalization with the program ceasing to work for the individual after illegal activities have ceased and a sufficient probation period has passed. This problem is naturally irrelevant for programs not bound by principles of individual freedom and human rights, such as is the case in many countries in Africa and the Middle East-e.g., Saudi Arabia, Malaysia or Indonesia, which are based on a state-sanctioned version of Islam (e.g., Wahhabism). Nevertheless, these countries which have mostly implemented prisonbased rehabilitation programs with a strong theological component have been confronted with this issue as well. Some programs were implemented because counter-terrorism operations had swept a large amount of inmates into prisons without any charge or any crime being committed, even in the countries with more conservative and stricter legal frameworks, such as the Middle East and Africa. For example, the Religious Dialogue Committee in Yemen were forced to face the fact that most inmates were not charged with any offenses, had been arrested in dubious circumstances, and aimed to restore some form of allegiance to the Yemeni government, shown by the signing of respective declarations at the end of the program (e.g., see Birk, 2009; Boucek, Beg, & Horgan, 2008; El-Said, 2012; Porges, 2010; Seifert, 2010). Therefore, it was suggested that the “Yemeni government was less interested in actual the disengagement of militants than with political expediency” (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010, p. 52). Other programs have been known to include ‘disciplining’ actions (i.e., beatings and other forms of torture) to force the mostly uncharged inmates to comply with the program’s dialogue process, such as in Malaysia (Speckhard, 2010). The prison-based program in Sudan reportedly does not admit those inmates who have committed any crime or murder, which leaves one wondering why the inmates are in prison in the first place (El-Said, 2015, p. 79). In this way, many Middle Eastern, Asian, and African DDP’s have been criticized not only for their poor human rights standards, but also for the abuse and ignorance of their own existing legal frameworks (e.g., Birk, 2009; Boucek et al., 2008; El-Said, 2012; Harrigan, 2012; Porges, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010; Seifert, 2010; Speckhard, 2010), which is problematic in at least
two ways. First, it creates the wrong motivation to participate in such a program-i.e., to have abuse, torture, and inhumane prison conditions eased for the individual inmates (e.g., in Indonesia, Malaysia, Sudan, Nigeria, etc.). Second, it has been argued that some of these rehabilitation programs were, in fact, started by the local governments out of fear of releasing a significant number of potentially radicalized or angry individuals (due to their mistreatment and illegal arrest) back into society without any form of ‘treatment,’ including after release monitoring (e.g., in Yemen). To assess the impact of programs in which the participants are forced to comply or-by the conditions in prisons-see the program as a simple form of improving one’s own living situation is highly problematic. This does not mean that a strong security or even intelligence component cannot be integrated into these rehabilitation programs without compromising the legal standards of the endeavor. Positive examples of this can be seen, for example, in Singapore (e.g., El-Said, 2015; Gunaratna & Bin Mohamed Hassan, 2015; Rabasa et al., 2010; Ramakrishna, 2014) and Saudi Arabia (e.g., al-Hadlaq, 2015; Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Cline, 2009; El-Said & Barrett, 2012). Questionable coercive methods to make inmates participate in any form of ideological re-education program are not limited to non-democratic countries. Although not a coherent and structured deradicalization program, the Israeli prison system has made some effort to make incarcerated Palestinians participate in various programs designed to change their ideological standpoint on the use of violence. Ganor and Falk (2013, p. 125) explain:
Prison authorities have a variety of rewards and sanctions at their disposal, all of which can be used to convince inmates to participate in the deradicalization process, or which may influence their individual cost-benefit calculations. In return for cooperating with and participating in meetings, de-radicalization lessons, indoctrination sessions, non-religious/ non-ideological work, or academic, vocational or professional education, a prisoner may be rewarded with family visits, telephone calls, canteen purchases (goods and food), preferred cooking facilities and accommodations, and leisure activities. A prisoner who fails to cooperate with or participate in such activities, may be penalized in these same areas.
