ABSTRACT

This chapter explores the relationship between a monistic ontology and a genuine intersubjectivity. It discusses some prominent criticisms of Hegelian intersubjectivity which are critical of ontological monism, stating that it cannot found genuine sociality or intersubjectivity, and defend Hegel against such criticisms. The chapter reconsiders the historical dialogue between Hegelian and Kantian theoretical and practical philosophy from the perspective of tragic and ethical conflict. It also examines briefly the role played by Hegel's theology in his account of intersubjectivity. It is to questions of monistic ontology and the repression thesis that the author turn at the end of the chapter, but before this discussion takes place, it is necessary to examine more thoroughly what intersubjectivity might mean. Simulation theory and theory-theory are positions in psychology and not philosophy, but the debate, which continues, has a great impact on philosophical questions that are being considered here, particularly the question of cognition's involvement in recognition and the phenomena.