ABSTRACT
This chapter shows how Lewis criticizes the epistemic given, then turns to the defense of the semantic given. The epistemic given has both epistemic efficacy and epistemic independence. The chapter argues that Lewis's implicit commitment to the Myth of the Given does not depend on the flawed interpretation of Lewis as a phenomenalist that Hanna tacitly endorses. The key difference lies in how Lewis's refined typology of statements allows him to make the semantic foundationalism more explicit than in Mind and the World Order (MWO). The chapter then focuses on recent scholarship that emphasizes Lewis's 'Kantian pragmatism' and rejection of epistemological foundationalism, as he construed it. It also shows that Lewis's implicit commitment to the semantic given spoils what would otherwise be Lewis's anticipation of the discursive/somatic distinction central to bifurcated intentionality. Finally, the chapter examines how and why Lewis accepts the semantic given, such that his position is vulnerable to Sellarsian objections.
