ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes the need for a new account of intentionality, what the author call bifurcated intentionality. Two philosophically salient reasons motivated this account: the need to respond to Rosenberg's eliminativism about intentionality and the need to satisfy the demand for transcendental friction. The chapter shows how the account of bifurcated intentionality can be used to resolve two debates examined earlier: the McDowell-Sellars debate and the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. A salient advantage of bifurcated intentionality is that people can accept Sellars's thought in a modified form: that discursive intentionality is not world-relational. The chapter focuses on three philosophers: Lance, Kukla, and Mark Okrent, who have advanced similar views. Whereas Kukla and Lance emphasize the normative pragmatics of discursive practices and aim for a more concrete and embodied conception of those practices than Brandom achieved, Okrent emphasizes the importance of an intentionality of purposive animal behaviour upon which the intentionality of rationality depends.
