ABSTRACT

Dobzhansky writes (p. 128): 'No theory of evolutionary ethics can be acceptable unless it gives a satisfactory explanation of just why the promotion of evolutionary development must be regarded as the summum bonum . ... Despite any exhortations to the contrary, man will not permanently deny himself the right to question the wisdom of anything, including the wisdom of his evolutionary direction.' In writing this, Dobzhansky was presumably using the word 'wisdom' in a rather general sense, and not with the special connotation with which I have employed it here. When used without previous indication of a particular meaning, the word may be taken in several different senses. From the general tenor of the discussion, one suspects that the meaning which was uppermost in Dobzhansky's mind was one in which 'wisdom' was more or less equivalent to 'goodness', so that his criticism becomes equivalent to the usual argument of philosophers against the naturalistic fallacy, as it has been set forth, for instance, by Moore (p. 51). An answer to this has already been given: what I am trying to do is not to formulate another description by which goodness can be recognized, but a criterion by which beliefs concerning the nature of goodness can be judged; and I have pointed out that such a criterion for judgement of a different logical status to the notion of goodness itself. I suggested that the word 'wisdom' might be used in a restricted sense to refer to a criterion of this kind. If one were to interpret the 'wisdom' in Dobzhansky's sentence in this restricted manner, his remarks would, I think, no longer amount to a criticism. In this narrow sense 1 have defined 'wisdom' as a belief which fulfils sufficiently the function of mediating evolutionary advance. One could, therefore, not question the wisdom of evolutionary advance since that is a matter of definition. One could continue to question the wisdom of anything else, but if the word is being used in this sense, the definition of it provides a method by which one could answer the question.