ABSTRACT

Although, in most cases, the inter-regional diffusion of innovation in USA is derived from competition hypotheses, ‘competitive policy diffusion’ under the federalist structure differs greatly from the ‘championship policy diffusion’ caused by the competition between local governments in China. Under the federalist structure, the voters who mainly influence local government behaviours are more concerned with the outcome of the policy instead of whether their government is the pioneer adopter of such policy. In complicated situations, state politicians strive to seek shorter means of formulating new policies and are thus are more inclined to select solutions that have been proven effective and promising (Walker 1969). Therefore, the competition among local governments in federalist structures tends to result in the convergence of policy goals and instruments. On the contrary, the championship policy diffusion between neighbouring local governments engaged in performance competition in China is more inclined towards the convergence of policy goals but to the divergence of policy instruments. Unsurprisingly, if two local governments under the jurisdiction of different superior governments are not involved in performance evaluation competition, the learner is likely to duplicate directly the policy instrument from other areas to improve its performances. Therefore, the learner will play the role as the pioneering adopter of the new policy within its own area.