ABSTRACT
Those who fail to make careful observations believe that the term ‘being’ (hastī) applies to these ten categories in name only, such that all ten have a single name, the meaning of which, however, is not unique (yakī). But this view is not correct. Were it correct, then in discourse, when we say ‘a substance is’ (jauhar ast), it would be the same as to say ‘substance substance’. Hence the meaning (ma‘na) of the existence of a substance would not be different from the meaning of substantiality. And likewise, if being were applied to quality, its meaning would not differ from that of quality. From these suppositions it would follow that to assert, ‘a quality is’ would be equal to asserting ‘quality quality’ and to assert ‘a substance is’ would be like asserting ‘a substance substance’. Consequently, it is not correct that each thing either is or is not, because there would not be one single meaning for being (i.e. ‘is’, hast), but ten meanings. The same assertion holds true for ‘is not’. Hence, the division (qisma) of an existential assertion would not be twofold (i.e. have a twofold truth value). This reasoning, however, is meaningless (sukhun ma‘nā nabūdī), for all sages know that whenever one asserts that there is a substance and that there is an accident, only one meaning is implied, in the same manner that ‘is’ (i.e. being, hastī) ‘and is not’ (nīstī) refer only to one meaning. Indeed, if a reference is made to being as a particular ( khāṣṣ), then the being of each thing is unique (dīgar) as a particular substance is unique for each entity. 2
