ABSTRACT
We have found that if two entities were called ‘Necessary Existent’, then without a doubt there would be a differentia (faṣl) or a distinguishing mark ( khāṣṣa) for each. We have also found that both the differentia and the distinguishing mark do not occur in the essence (reality) of that which is universal. Hence, the Necessary Existent is a Necessary Existent without that differentia and that distinguishing mark. If we imagine only the nonexistence of that differentia and that distinguishing mark, one of these two cases would follow. Either each would be like the Necessary Existent or each would not be like It. If they were like the Necessary Existent, they would be two different things without, however, the distinctions of differentia and distinguishing mark, which is impossible. If they were not like It, then having a differentia and a distinguishing mark would be an essential condition for the necessary existence of the Necessary Existent, and this condition would have to be the essence of the Necessary Existent. Thus, differentia and distinguishing mark would come under the common idea of essence (ma‘nā-i ‘āmm), which is absurd. Indeed, if existence were other than essence, then this could be a legitimate alternative. But, for the Necessary Existent, existence is either due to essence or it is essence. Consequently, the Necessary Existent cannot be a duality (du’ī) in essence, in differentia, or in the distinguishing mark. 2 For this reason, the ‘Necessary Existent’ cannot be a characteristic that is applied to two things. Yet we have found that a cause is contained (andar) in the elements of any universal idea. For this reason, the Necessary Existent is not universal. If It were a universal, It would be an effect, and would not, therefore, be different from being a contingent being, which is impossible according to our demonstration.
