ABSTRACT

One cannot know whether or not that entity exists for which it is possible (mumkin) to be as well as not to be. One may know that a contingent being is a contingency (mumkin) since contingency is necessary to a contingent being, whereas the existence (būdan) or the non-existence (na-būdan) of a contingent being is not necessary to being a contingency. Since being contingent is necessary, the contingent being may become known (dānista), whereas it is not possible for existence or non-existence to become known since they are not necessities. If it could be known that the contingent being existed while it was possible for it not to exist, at the time it was not in existence, knowledge would be falsehood (durūgh ). Falsehood, however, applies not to knowledge but only to opinion (gumān). If something cannot exist, then it is not possible for its being and its ‘not being’ to exist.