ABSTRACT
All action which comes from an agent is due either to nature (ṭab‘) to will ( khwāst), or to accident (‘araḍ), as we have already explained. Action coming from knowledge (dānish ), however, is due neither to nature nor to accident (‘araḍ). Nor, moreover, is such action devoid of will. If someone knows that an action results from him and his agentness (i.e. his awareness of his role as a knower), then that action becomes known due to him (i.e. due to the activity of his knowledge). But action which arises from the will is accompanied by either knowledge, opinion (gumān), or imagination (takhayyul). 1 That which results from knowledge is illustrated by the acts of the engineer or the physician which are derived from the science they know. Avoiding a thing which is regarded as being dangerous illustrates an action which results from opinion. Examples of actions which come from the imagination are the following: (1) avoiding something which resembles something foul, or (2) the heart’s desire for something which resembles a beautiful thing. In the second example, that which resembles the beautiful thing is requested by way of association. An act of the Necessary Existent cannot be due to an opinion or to the imagination because both are accidental as well as receptive to change, whereas the Necessary Existent, as we have established, is a necessity in every aspect. Consequently, Its will must arise out of knowledge. Is it not appropriate to explain this will, to describe it, and to portray it by means of some illustrations?
