ABSTRACT
All things, except the first, are united in the one idea (jak ma’nā). While they are necessary in one aspect, they are contingent in another aspect. Their contingent aspect implies that they are not active agents (bafi’ljudā-and). It becomes evident, therefore, that apart from the primary being, nothing is devoid ( khāli) of this potentiality (quwwatī), for all other entities are related to a materiallike aspect as well as to a form-like aspect. That which is similar to a material is its contingent aspect, and that which resembles form is its necessary aspect. 1 Consequently, the one (fard), unique (yagāna) reality is the primary being. With the exception of the primary being, there are differences (ikhtilāf) among things due to being (hastī) and due to necessity. The contingent aspect of being is manifest in three kinds of entities. The first of these, called an intelligence (’aql), is a unity, although it is a contingency. Another kind is of such a nature that the being of each entity contained in it is a unity while it is receptive (padhīr) to the forms of other beings. The first and second kinds of entities are distinguished in two ways. (1) There is either a material kind (jismi) of entity receptive to being which become divisible due to its material nature as a receptor. Or (2) there is a kind of soul-self (nafs) due to which beings do not become divisible because it does not receive a divided being. Divisibility produces multiplicity. The multiplicity in things (qismat padhir) is due either to an intelligent indication (ishdrat-i ‘aql), such that definitions can be constructed on the basis of a differentiation, or it is exclusively due to sense experience (ḥiss). For intelligence, therefore, no differentiation is made within the context of spatial diversity, as for example, that something is at one place and another thing is at another place. Hence, there are three kinds of substantial beings: the intelligence being (’aql), the soul-self (nafs), and the body (jism). 2
