ABSTRACT

The Necessary Existent cannot contain a multiplicity as though it were composed of many elements, as a man’s body consists of many parts. The Necessary Existent cannot have different kinds of parts, each standing by itself and forming a unit, such as wood and clay in a house. 1 Nor can such parts be separate in idea (ma‘nā) but not in essence ( dhāt) in the manner matter and form are ‘separate’ in natural bodies. Hence, the possibilities mentioned here are ruled out, for if any of them were accurate, then the Necessary Existent would have to be united with the causes as we explained before. Different properties cannot be contained in the Necessary Existent, for if Its essence were realized with such properties, they would be together as parts. If Its essence ( dhāt) were realized and the properties were accidental (‘araḍī), then they would subsist in the Necessary Existent for their essence due to another cause. Consequently, the Necessary Existent would be a receptacle. But from what we have asserted it has become evident that the Necessary Existent is not the receptacle in essence. It cannot, moreover, be the case that these attributes are due to the Necessary Existent Itself, for It would then be a receptacle. From one idea no more than one thing can be realized, for we have proved that whatever comes from a cause is not realized until it becomes necessary. Consequently, when one entity becomes a necessity from a single idea (yak ma‘nā) and another entity also becomes a necessity from the same idea, then something must become a necessity due to something else because of the nature of the former due to which something becomes a necessity. It becomes a necessity due to two reasons. One of these originates, for example, from this nature and this will, whereas the other comes from that nature and that will. Another duality is then placed into this context. Discourse would then be directed at this duality and the argument would start anew. Hence, there is no multiplicity in the Necessary Existent.