ABSTRACT
It is widely recognized that the European crisis – an amalgam of financial, fiscal, institutional and constitutional crisis (Mene´ndez 2013) – exhibits, but also amplifies, asymmetries and tensions in the European Union’s (EU) institutional structure and make-up. Many analysts have noted that the crisis may reinforce differentiated integration, where the centralization of authority and its territorial scope vary strongly across policies (Leuffen et al. 2013). Prior to the crisis, much of the discussion of differentiated integration focused on the process as one of different speeds (Piris 2012). All would reach the same destination, but at different speeds, not simultaneously. The crisis has politicized the integration process and has rendered starkly apparent that differentiated integration is not a mere technique of integration or an approach to problem-solving that can be instrumentalized; it is a deeply political process and a way of relating to conflicts. There are winners and losers, and outcomes often reflect prevailing power constellations rather than efficient solutions to policy problems. The crisis has raised serious questions about the assumption that all EU
member states will continue to move in the same integrationist direction.
