ABSTRACT
Introduction In the preceding two chapters, I outlined the moral and pragmatic problems associated with the use of political violence. First, the fact of moral disagreement and uncertainty over the principles that might distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence means that the use of violence can never be free of its implication in cycles of violence or of the possibility that it may be an unjust use of violence. Second, even if one decides to disregard these moral problems in favor of an argument of necessity, political violence reveals itself to be much less effective at and much less predictable in achieving traditional aims such as defense, protection, and victory than is generally assumed; and it becomes inherently incapable of achieving these ends if they are revised to incorporate more inclusive conceptions of identity and security. I have already briefly suggested ways in which nonviolent strategies may be better equipped to avoid these problems, but it is the task of this chapter, first, to elaborate more fully upon how the adoption of nonviolent strategies addresses central debates in normative IR and political theory and, second, to develop a taxonomy of nonviolent action, indicating the different forms it may take and purposes it may serve in various contexts. Ultimately, while the use of nonviolent action enables us to actively pursue our particular ethico-political projects in a way that nurtures difference and enacts responsibility towards others (to the extent that doing so fully is ever possible), this does not mean that nonviolent action operates purely on the basis of the opponent’s persuasion on some (nonexistent) plane free of power relations. Rather, nonviolent action in all its forms – struggle, intervention, and defense – is political action that thereby embraces power, operating through a combination of coercive and transformative mechanisms.
