ABSTRACT
This chapter explains some of the philosophical issues surrounding the idea of non-combatant immunity in war. In particular, it looks at why the principle of non-combatant immunity permits the collateral killing of non-combatants, but prohibits the intentional killing of non-combatants. Usually, this position is explained by invoking the doctrine of double effect (DDE). The discussion in this chapter proceeds on the assumptions that one can distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and that there is typically something wrong with killing non-combatants that does not extend to the killing of combatants. The use of non-combatants as human shields brings some of the debates concerning how one can apply the principle of non-combatant immunity, into particularly sharp focus. Since the precautionary principle allows combatants to act knowing that there is a substantial risk that they will cause harm to non-combatants, it looks as though it sanctions the reckless harming of non-combatants.
