ABSTRACT
A fundamental problem for the principle of non-combatant immunity is the difficulty of explaining why non-combatants are immune from intentional attack. But none of the candidate criteria seem to result in the sharp line that is assumed by much of just war theory and international law. Therefore, the chapter considers George Mavrodes claim that the notion of non-combatant immunity is a mere convention that arises out of attempts to limit the harms of war and also looked at the implications of Jeff McMahan's responsibility-based account of wars for non-combatant immunity. Thus McMahan's view, with its emphasis on individual moral responsibility, cannot support any intrinsic difference between combatants and non-combatants that supports a universal principle of non-combatant immunity. But it does have some resources that can limit the impact of undermining this principle, offering non-combatants a more contingent form of protection against intentional attack.
