ABSTRACT
In the history of rhetoric, had Isocrates been a lone voice for moderation and justice, a lone advocate for a rhetoric based on cooperation rather than egoistic conflict and competition, his success would remain impressive—but he would have been an aberration, relegated to some kind of atypical utopian moment in the long and uneven evolution of human relationships. Quintilian’s rhetoric, then, is not a neutral instrument, ready to be pressed into service for any cause. His vision of rhetoric at its best is not “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion”. This is a crucial distinction that, earlier, helped separate Isocratean rhetoric from its Aristotelian counterpart. For Quintilian, as for Isocrates, rhetoric becomes a virtue not only by lending its power to the concepts of justice and moderation but also by gradually shaping the character of the rhetorician.
