ABSTRACT
Dual process theory (DPT) is a theoretical framework commonly associated with the field of reasoning and decision making which proposes that thinking is characterised by the action of two systems with distinctive cognitive processes. These processes can be classified as Type 1 (T1): fast, automatic, unconscious and effortless by nature, and Type 2 (T2): slow, controlled, conscious, effortful and demanding of working memory (WM) (Evans, 2009). T1 processes depend on context for the production of intuitive conclusions whilst T2 processes are context independent and can deliver judgments that are sensitive to logical structure using explicit information only (Stanovich & West, 2000). These processes are thought to play a significant role in guiding everyday reasoning, judgment and decision making, with responses reflecting the extent to which they draw upon T1 or T2 processes. Whilst often T1 processes will deliver judgments that draw upon relevant knowledge and provide a useful guide to action, on occasions T1 and T2 processes will suggest differing responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The focus of this chapter is on just these types of situation, where a conflict occurs between competing responses. We will examine the extent to which studies of conflict resolution provide support for dual process theories and suggest that, contrary to the claims of these accounts, many of the paradigmatic cases of conflict cited in support of DPTs actually provide very weak evidence indeed.
