Introduction

Introduction This is a book about separatism and, more specifically, the rise of violent separatism in the South Asian states of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Home to approximately one fifth of the world’s population, these states have faced significant challenges in overcoming the legacy of colonial rule to unite diverse populations under a single national banner since gaining independence. Included within these difficulties have been separatist movements that, rejecting state-sponsored projects of nation building, have violently articulated an alternative construction of political community to challenge the state’s territorial integrity and ideological foundations. Although only one of these movements – that which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 – has been successful, the number and cumulative cost of separatist movements measured in lives lost, infrastructure destroyed, redirected government spending to less productive sectors, and foregone investment has been an enormous burden that these developing states could ill afford. Understanding the reasons behind the advent of separatism, and the apparent failure of South Asian states to reconcile territorially concentrated sub-national communities to state-sponsored narratives of national identity, is important to the successful reintegration of these communities within the state’s institutional fabric. Only by identifying the reasons why these groups failed to ‘buy into’ the rhetoric of national unity is it possible to construct a consensus around their inclusion. Moreover, understanding how processes of state formation can alienate some communities – prompting them to seek alternative jurisdictions of state sovereignty – is necessary if South Asian states are to avoid similar problems in their contemporary programs of economic growth and reform. The dramatic increase in population and disposable income of South Asia’s middle and entrepreneurial classes holds out the promise of a reinvigorated national unity founded upon new economic opportunities that, if not properly managed, could also alienate marginal communities excluded from the benefits of economic development. However, the question of why some groups desire to separate from their parent state is far from a straightforward one. There are some communities whose grievances and marginalization on the state’s ideological and economic

periphery make them ideal candidates for independent statehood, but who do not rebel. In contrast, other groups that apparently have few good reasons to secede (and even less prospect of being successful) decide to do so. These concerns raise the question of to what degree separatism is attributable to political processes, calculations of rational self-interest and other factors amenable to scientific analysis, or emotive and atavistic factors ‘hardwired’ into groups. Are there identifiable factors that make mobilization behind a separatist agenda probable or feasible? In order to address these questions, this book adopts a comparative approach in which the major separatist movements in South Asia since decolonization are contrasted with one another in order to identify trends, dis/similarities and other factors pertinent to the origins and trajectory of conflict. In addition to sharing a common objective, separatist groups in South Asia have frequently been contemporaneous with one another and possessed other common characteristics, including a collective identity defined in opposition to that of the state’s nationbuilding project; sentiments of economic and political grievance that sustain perceptions of difference and neglect; and the contextualization of these claims within the regional rivalries and superpower politics of South Asia. In addition, the factors associated with separatism in the scholarly literature – sentiments of injustice, calculations of self-interest and the development of a separate national identity – have all been true of South Asian separatist groups as their ideology, membership and tactics changed over time. This similarity provides sufficient construct equivalence to allow meaningful comparison between the cases included within the book, while also acknowledging pertinent differences that help to explain the diverse trajectories that each of these conflicts has taken. This initial chapter introduces the project, defines ‘separatism,’ explains why a rational explanation for separatism is important, and details the mainstream explanatory theories that dominate the scholarly literature on separatism. The chapter argues that none of these theories is mutually exclusive of any other, and that separatism occurs as a consequence of a range of features that dynamically interact with one another and transform over time as various factions within a movement struggle for dominance and react to changes in the strategic environment. Indeed, it is important to recognize that, just like separatist movements, neither the state nor relevant third parties (such as foreign diasporas) are unitary actors. Consequently, a satisfactory explanatory theory must incorporate the dynamism, ambiguity, contradictions and instability that characterize the different parties to a separatist dispute. This theme is continued in Chapter 2, which examines the origins of separatism in India (Punjab, Kashmir, the northeast), Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tract), Sri Lanka (Tamil minority) and Pakistan (Balochistan). Particular emphasis is placed upon processes of state formation and how the liberal values and discourses of the equality of rights, universal human values, the supremacy of law and state sovereignty in South Asia’s nascent post-colonial states clashed with social and political reality, in which de facto sovereignty was frequently exercised by extra-state actors and local despotisms through networks of patronage and power. The effect of this dissonance

on the state’s nation-building project is discussed in combination with other factors pertinent to the mobilization of a population behind a separatist agenda (e.g., effective leadership and external support from third parties) and how state policies have contributed to the development of separatism. More importantly, this chapter also examines the notion of state sovereignty and how its conceptualization as an absolute, exclusive and fundamental feature of the political landscape has dis-/incentivized separatism. Many prior studies have adopted a protagonist-centric approach by first selecting either the state or sub-group as the relevant unit of analysis, and then proceeding to isolate pertinent features around which an explanatory narrative is constructed. In contrast, this book adopts a broader perspective by shifting the conceptual focus from the protagonist to the institutional architecture and artifices that structure a group’s pursuit of independence from its parent state. Put simply, because separatism does not occur in an institutional vacuum, it is first necessary to say something about what it is that groups aspire to in their pursuit of a separatist agenda, before moving to the secondary questions of why they hold this aspiration and the tactics used in its pursuit. More particularly, the book argues that many of the demands and strategies employed by separatists and the state from which they seek autonomy, although often apparently futile or contradictory, are explicable in terms of sovereignty’s constituent claims. Chapter 3 continues with a discussion of how separatist movements in South Asia have developed over time and the strategies used by these groups and their parent states. Of particular concern is the dynamic interplay between separatists and state as each attempts to gain a strategic advantage through a process of ‘controlled disorder.’ Common tactics employed by the state to this end include the indiscriminate use of military force, outsourcing of security functions to vigilantes, draconian security legislation, and infliction of economic harm upon inhabitants of the affected region though diminished investment and heightened unemployment. Similarly, separatists frequently target essential infrastructure and engage in high-profile, mass casualty attacks to demonstrate government impotence, cripple the local economy and put pressure on the state to concede to their demands. However, this is a high-risk strategy, as indiscriminate and largescale violence can alienate essential public support. In this manner, factors pertaining to self-interest (strategic advantage derived from the use of violence and infliction of harm) intersect with grievance (perceptions of injustice engendered in consequence of a rival party’s use of violence or infliction of harm) and the politics of identity to undermine the state’s legal-rational legitimacy and claims to be the true representative of a region’s inhabitants. In Chapter 4, the focus shifts to the ending of conflict. Of the disputes considered in this book, two (Punjab and Sri Lanka) have concluded with state victory, one (Bangladesh) ended with a victory for the separatists, while the others continue at varying levels of intensity. The chapter addresses the reasons for the failure of separatists to achieve their goals and the factors that have restricted the state from re-establishing normalcy despite its clear military advantage. The chapter also contrasts the construal of state sovereignty as a

binary and exclusive feature with the reality of its exercise by a range of un/official local actors within the context of efforts to address local grievances through power-sharing arrangements. Policies such as the linguistic reorganization of Indian states in the 1950s and the subsequent creation of new states have proven a double-edged sword, creating new divisions as they addressed long-standing grievances. This theme is continued in the fifth, and final, chapter, which addresses the future of separatism in South Asia, given the rising death toll in the region as a consequence of sub-state political conflict but the decline in separatist-related violence. Of particular note here are sovereignty’s multi-layered and diffuse characteristics, which, in conjunction with economic and political reforms, have reduced the ‘pull’ factors that incentivize sub-national groups to pursue a separatist agenda. Consequently, the book argues, there remains a dissonance between the concept of sovereignty as a binary, exclusive and state-centric property, on the one hand, and the reality of its exercise as a multi-layered, constantly emergent property possessed by a range of non-/state actors, on the other. Moreover, many of the ‘push’ factors associated with violent separatism in South Asia – economic discrimination, human rights abuses and poverty – remain a problem. Indeed, the states of South Asia continue to struggle to maintain a position of neutrality, instead championing ideological values and engaging in discriminatory practices, such as election rigging and distorted economic development, that reward mainstream communities at the expense of those on the nation’s periphery. However, the decline of the state as the dominant social and economic actor in many spheres means that anti-government activism and violence generally take the form of civil disobedience, criminality and revolution rather than separatism. Before proceeding to discuss the factors correlated with separatism, it is first necessary to discuss what separatism is. For the purposes of this book, separatism may be defined as the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial or political separation from the parent state and its majority population. Consequently, separatism may take a variety of forms, consisting in a range of positions along a continuum of independence (Wood 1981; Pavković and Cabestan 2013) from the state’s authority, including: (a) claims for special rights, permissions, privileges, benefits or exemptions concerning the group’s cultural rites and traditional practices; (b) preferential access to resources controlled by the state; and (c) a measure of political autonomy and self-rule up to (and including) independent statehood. Examples of these concentrically expanding rights include the right of Sikhs to wear traditional daggers (Kirpan) in public and to be exempted from motorcycle helmet laws, granting official status to indigenous languages and subsidizing their teaching in public schools such as the formal standing given to Maori in New Zealand, and the semi-autonomous territories of Nunavut and Nunatsiavut in Canada. At the extreme end of this continuum lies independent statehood – the complete political separation of a territory and its inhabitants from the state’s sovereignty – which is the outcome of secession (Wood 1981). Thus, while secessionists are by definition also separatists, the inverse is not necessarily true; many separatist groups pursue an agenda that stops

short of independent statehood. However, despite this conceptual distinction, a clear division between separatism and secessionism is unsustainable. Many secessionist groups start as separatist, pursuing lesser forms of autonomy than independent statehood, and become secessionist as these demands are rebuffed – often violently – by the parent state. Similarly, many secessionist groups may be prepared to settle for a lesser degree of autonomy than independent statehood, and employ the demand to secede as a bargaining tool to achieve separatist goals. Indeed, most political movements that aim to radically reduce the state’s authority over their affairs contain both separatist and secessionist elements that vie for positions of leadership and influence within the group. The concern of this book is with groups who have for the most part pursued secessionist objectives. Defining secession as an extreme point on a continuum of political independence has the advantage of side-stepping a dispute in the scholarly literature concerning whether secession occurs only where a former sovereign does not consent to the new state’s creation (Crawford 2006) or, pace Radan (2008), includes cases of decolonization, the dissolution of federations and the partition of states. However, there remains the difficulty that, despite the feasibility of a conceptual distinction between separatism and secessionism, a practical distinction is not plausible, as most secessionist movements contain separatist elements and vice versa. Thus, while the main concern of the book is with secession and the descriptive and explanatory features of the groups that pursue it, because a practical distinction between secession and separatism is untenable, it is necessary to clarify the terminology used throughout the book. Accordingly, the term ‘secession’ shall refer to an act of political division whereby a group and the territory it occupies are removed from the sovereignty of the parent state to that of a neighboring or newly created state. In contrast, ‘separatist’ is a descriptive term used to denote groups, tactics, policies and other phenomena that have secession as their ostensible aim (but which may also include elements prepared to settle for lesser forms of autonomy from the parent state). Finally, ‘separatism’ is the advocacy or practice of removing a portion of the state’s territory and its inhabitants, substantively or entirely, from the sovereignty of the state. Separatism is perhaps the most contentious of political acts. To states that resist their demands, separatists are invidious malcontents whose agenda constitutes a frontal assault on the unity and integrity of the state – the most fundamental component of peace and order in the international arena. With few exceptions, separatist demands provoke a determined and often violent response from the parent state; the majority of separatist disputes descend into violence or civil war, and even in the case of secessions that do occur relatively peacefully (e.g., Singapore’s departure from Malaysia or the bifurcation of Czechoslovakia), the aftermath of separation is often a legacy of mistrust, bitterness and rivalry. It is, therefore, unsurprising that many theorists have drawn an analogy between separatism and divorce, since both are emotionally charged events that can profoundly affect the self-identity and long-term economic prospects of the disputing parties and those around them.