Genesis of conflict

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dynamics that influence mobilization behind the cause of separatism through the conceptual lens of state sovereignty. In the remainder of this section, the concept of state sovereignty and its constituent claims of embodiment and necessity are clarified. Subsequent sections examine how the institution of state sovereignty has contributed to separatism in the post-colonial states of South Asia. This is achieved through an analysis of the factors associated with separatism in these regions from the perspective of sovereignty’s constituent components of embodiment and necessity. In particular, the role of predecessor institutions of sovereignty that pre-date contemporary South Asian states’ predatory and discriminatory government policies, economic and social under-development (including demographic concerns regarding a failure by the state to control population movement), and human rights abuses are highlighted as key triggers. In each conflict, these factors manifest in markedly different ways. Nonetheless, the common thread linking them is the rejection of the state’s claim to represent the identities and essential interests of all of its citizens equally, thereby rendering the state sub-optimal in comparison with an imagined post-secession state of affairs. The previous chapter highlighted how most explanatory accounts of separatism have selected either the minority or the parent state as the relevant unit of analysis. In contrast, comparatively scant attention has been paid to the nature of state sovereignty and historical processes of state formation pertaining to the parent state and the successful integration of predecessor institutions of governance. This is remarkable, given that if state sovereignty did not exist, then neither would separatism (at least in the form in which we recognize it). More importantly, it overlooks how sovereignty’s conceptualization as a unitary, exclusive property possessed wholly by states maximizes citizens’ compliance (upon which the state’s legitimacy rests), but sits uncomfortably with the reality of sovereignty’s exercise. To explain, while coercive associations have existed since the beginning of recorded history, the state is distinguished by the ubiquity, breadth and legalrational justification of its authority. With the exception of lawless or failed

states, almost all of the world’s population finds itself governed by the institution of the modern state, which exercises a degree of regulatory control historically unprecedented in scope and complexity. The legitimation of this enormous concentration of power rests in a secular discourse of human rights, selfdetermination and popular sovereignty (Griffiths 2003) embodied in the institution of citizenship that bestows an equality of status upon individuals. In this manner, state sovereignty gives formal expression to citizens’ shared values, understandings and aspirations as the optimal means by which individual welfare and the social product – i.e., the property, goods, services and values in a community (Sangmpam 2007) – are safeguarded by virtue of the state’s ability to enforce binding, non-partisan rules of conduct. Thus, individuals obey, their compliance generating the order and public goods that reaffirm the state as society’s sole legitimate representative and guardian, ensuring further compliance in a mutual feedback loop that validates the social contract and legitimacy of the legal-rational state. However, while the institutions of statehood and state sovereignty may share a common philosophical heritage in the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, the history of their formation varies markedly. The conventional view of sovereignty is of an ontological binary, absolute, indivisible property vested in distinct territorial political communities. In reality, however, sovereignty has numerous, overlapping loci and a long history of being shared, contracted out or surrendered by states to alternative forms of social organization at both local (e.g., chiefs, vigilantes, political associations) and international (e.g., supranational bodies such as the European Parliament, Council of Europe and European Court of Justice) levels (Griffiths 2003). Consequently, the state’s authority is frequently dependent upon vestiges of sovereignty that inhere in non-state actors, including predecessor institutions to the state that continue to command citizens’ loyalty. The importance of recognizing sovereignty’s incomplete, constantly emergent, non-exclusive character to understanding the causes of separatism is evident when we consider that mobilizing a sub-group behind a separatist agenda requires more than mere dissatisfaction with the status quo. In addition, there must be a deep-seated belief that the alternative jurisdiction of sovereignty proffered by independence from the parent state would better safeguard the group members’ identity and common interests. Whereas nationalist theories focus upon the former consideration, greed and grievance theories emphasize the latter. The previous chapter highlighted how, rather than being mutually exclusive, greed, grievance and nationalism are complementary features that may be causally linked to one another in the mobilization of a population behind a separatist agenda. The present chapter develops this insight through an analysis of rational self-interest, remedial justice and national identity from the perspective of state sovereignty. In addition to offering a conceptual framework capable of encompassing these explanatory features, an emphasis on sovereignty is also essential to distinguish separatism from other forms of anti-government mobilization, such as revolution and civil disobedience, that may be rooted in causes

similar to those identified by greed, grievance and nationalist theories, but which do not include a claim to territorial sovereignty. Accordingly, because separatism is distinguished and defined by a sub-group’s claim to an alternative jurisdiction of territorial sovereignty (and, therefore, state sovereignty is a necessary condition for separatism), it offers an ideal perspective from which to analyze the development and trajectory of separatist movements. Moreover, a focus on the separatist group as the relevant unit of analysis limits possible solutions, given that the demographics, histories and collective identities of groups are notoriously resistant to change orchestrated by external forces. In contrast, because sovereignty is a constantly emergent, dynamic and fluid construct, it is a causal lever more amenable to intercession and capable of generating possible solutions to conflict. In particular, I shall argue that sovereignty can be understood as comprising two complementary components of embodiment (manifestation of citizens’ shared values, understandings and aspirations) and necessity (as the optimal means of securing a community’s welfare through the creation of an environment in which domestic peace and prosperity are enhanced). Accordingly, the moral legitimacy of the state resides in its ability to transcend the inadequacy of individual effort by addressing the problem of human aggression (Agnew 2005) to provide for the common good. Through the promulgation and enforcement of binding rules of conduct, the state reduces transgressions of individual rights and mitigates free-rider problems that plague the provision of public goods, thereby producing a state of affairs that (while not ideal from many individuals’ standpoints) is vastly superior to that which would obtain were each individual to act unilaterally. Moreover, because opposing conceptions of the public good and competition for limited social and natural resources engender disagreement, the state must manage this discord in accordance with norms of fairness as it mediates disputes between individuals and society’s constituent groups. Thus, the legal-rational legitimacy of state sovereignty rests in its ability not merely to secure an environment superior to counter-factual alternatives, but to do so in a non-partisan manner whereby the costs and benefits of compliance are fairly distributed to create the positive feedback loop of compliance and provision outlined earlier. Citizens obey, their obedience generating the public goods that validate the state’s status as the sole arbiter of society’s collective interests, affirming its ability to overcome the inadequacy of individual effort, and thereby ensuring the compliance that is a prerequisite to the continued provision of these goods. While states invariably arrogate to themselves the status of an indivisible political and territorial community, the brute fact is that the concept of state sovereignty does not contain within itself an answer to the question of what the state’s relevant territorial jurisdiction is. Consequently, solving the problem of necessity does not resolve the question of embodiment and of how the political community whose interests the state champions is to be constituted. Moreover, efforts by political theorists and states to address this challenge have been particularly unsatisfying. One response has been to invoke a conceptual and ethical

‘zero-point’ from where the law and political order are constituted in an attempt to reconcile (a) liberal accounts of individual agency, autonomy and selfgovernment that provide the philosophical basis of the legal-rational state and its doctrines of equal citizenship and human rights with (b) the corporate and coercive reality of state sovereignty. The pre-eminent example of this approach is social contract theory, predicated on the fiction of voluntary consent by reference to a pact between the governed and a sovereign to establish a political order by which individuals’ natural rights may be more effectively protected. However, reference to individual consent to delineate the community to which the state’s sovereignty is to apply (Beran 1987; Gauthier 1994; Wellman 2005) simply begs the question it attempts to answer, since in order to consent to the sovereignty of a state, there must first be a state to consent to (Mayall 2013). In reality, when asked to point to a historical incidence of such a covenant, the best we are able to come up with are referendums on the question of whether or not to secede in Virginia (1861), Texas (1861), Western Australia (1933), Quebec (1995), South Sudan (2011) and Crimea (2014). Indeed, few existing states were created through voluntary contract, and only naturalized citizens expressly consent to the sovereignty of a particular state (the rest of us have these matters determined by morally arbitrary factors such as parentage or place of birth). Not to be deterred by the shortcomings of political theory, states have attempted to bridge the gap between individual agency and the coercive authority of the state through the structuring of protocols governing statehood, with the result that existing states are the final arbiter of which groups qualify as states. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713) marked the supersession of relations between diverse, feudal conflict-units and the hierarchical claims of Empire and Papacy by formal relations between modern sovereign states (Philpott 2001). Subsequently, international relations were institutionalized in diplomatic protocols, and states became both the architects and the subjects of international law, based on principles of mutual recognition and non-interference. Moreover, the exclusion of rival domestic centers of power through the establishment of bounded territories repressed the independence of the nobility to act as autonomous warlords. Consequently, a clear distinction emerged between the domestic and international spheres, with the result that non-sovereign lords and other corporate actors no longer played any formal or significant role in international relations (Griffiths 2003). Most importantly, states also came to determine both the rules of relations between states and the criteria of statehood, and, therefore, which groups would qualify as states through the principle of mutual recognition (Agnew 2005). This self-regulation might have proven unremarkable had states not afforded existing borders and the position of the state as the pre-eminent international actor the priority that they have. However, due to a fear of setting a precedent that might one day authorize their own dismemberment, existing states have been extraordinarily hesitant to recognize nascent states, even while endorsing propositions that ostensibly require them to do so. Thus, Articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations

(UN) charter affirm the right of all peoples to self-determination, but have been interpreted by states as conferring a right of decolonization tied in time and space to the withdrawal of European colonial administrations and limited by the principle of uti possidetis juris (as you possess lawfully), according to which newly formed states retained their pre-independence geographical borders (Mayall 2013). The outcome of these measures has been to reinforce the importance of statehood while neither reconciling the coercive aspects of state sovereignty with liberal ideals of self-government and autonomy, nor resolving disagreements concerning the justice of existing states’ borders. Consequently, the importance of statehood remains undiminished, and it remains a crucial status for groups seeking control over their affairs. Only states can attain representation in the international banking system and the UN, receive International Monetary Fund (IMF ) loans, possess inviolable land to attract investment, or be recognized as formal trade partners, members of political/military associations and signatories to economic treaties (Nordstrom 2000). However, while the ubiquity of the state as the dominant international actor speaks to its success, there remains an abiding dissonance between justifications of state sovereignty and the criteria that determine the territorial boundaries of states. Whereas the state’s legitimacy is grounded in principles of embodiment and necessity – as the institution best able to represent a community’s collective identity and protect its members’ individual and collective rights – a group’s status as a state is dependent upon recognition by other states (Radan 2010), and this often has nothing to do with the group’s ability to represent its citizens’ collective identity, provide public goods or maintain order. Consider, for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan, M23 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the de facto government of Somaliland. These groups exercised authority over a geographical area, enforced a code of justice, provided basic services and defended their territory against incursions from rival groups. However, they were all unsuccessful in obtaining the recognition of states, despite the fact that in some cases they exercised greater authority, enjoyed wider public support and were more effective at maintaining order than the internationally recognized government of a state that to all practical purposes continued to exist in name only. In summary, the thesis advanced here is that separatism does not occur in an institutional vacuum. Rather, the exercise and justification of state sovereignty frame separatist demands by dis-/incentivizing groups to pursue an alternative jurisdiction of sovereignty depending upon the group’s characteristics and circumstances. Consequently, even states that are highly effective in maintaining order and regulating competition for the social product may suffer from separatism if a sub-group perceives the state as discriminatory or predatory. This is because separatism is a claim to difference, not merely disadvantage, that challenges the ontological and moral character of the state as equivalent to that of the individual person in classical liberalism, with fixed boundaries and a permanent identity (Jacobson 1998; Skinner 1999). Cognizant of the arbitrary nature of state boundaries and the ever-emergent character of state sovereignty, separatism

assumes (and may even manufacture) a dissonant duality of identities that makes a sub-group’s political independence from the state the only acceptable outcome.

A striking feature of most separatist movements is their historical pedigree in the form of political institutions that precede the state and either have not been successfully integrated into the state’s institutional fabric or offer a better alternative to it by, for example, continuing to exercise authority at a sub-state level. In societies where the state has failed to abide by the social contract norms of the legal-rational state (typically by acting in a prejudiced or predatory manner), it becomes a sub-optimal solution to the problems of individual security and provision of public goods when viewed through the prism of the counter-factual alternative proffered by predecessor institutions of governance that the state had ostensibly replaced and rendered obsolete. Specifically, if the state has a framework of in/formal but widely agreed rules, conventions, practices and procedures that govern the allocation of resources, distribution of political power and peaceful settlement of grievances, then this may effectively eliminate opportunistic behavior (so-called ‘vanity secessions’) and the violent expression of grievance. However, in separatist-affected states, this social contract has broken down in consequence of a combination of institutional decay (which sees one group or class benefit at another’s expense), inadequate or incompetent economic management, expropriation of land and resources, ethnic rivalry over territory or other resources, and inadequate mechanisms of political representation. The collapse of the social contract – in combination with the lawlessness and political violence that frequently accompany it – further erodes attempts to amalgamate the state’s constituent communities into a cohesive political unit. Diminishment in public revenues, diversion of resources to less productive sectors of the economy, increased concentration of political power in the hands of an unaccommodating elite (rather than institutions), and use of draconian security legislation feed the over-centralization of political power and the politicization (or weakening) of state institutions. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict that validates separatist claims of grievance to assist the mobilization of marginalized communities against the state as the rules, conventions and shared understandings that once restrained conflict are eroded (cf. Murshed 2002). Note that this is not to suggest that the root cause of separatist violence is the Western-centric origins of statehood and territorial sovereignty. Kohli (1997) touches upon this issue when he observes that the separation between public and private realms that characterizes many Western states is often unrealizable in developing economies, in which government intrusions into citizens’ socioeconomic life politicize state institutions, which then become the center of competition for society’s elites and constituent groups. Similarly, Njoku (2010) claims that proponents of the ethno-nationalist paradigm – who call for the redrawing of political boundaries to create ethnically (more) homogeneous states as a solution to Africa’s problem of recurrent conflict – overlook the reality of