ABSTRACT
The problem of induction is one of a cluster of mysteries that lie at the centre of human experience. Thus a counter-inductive principle is as well supported by the evidence as an inductive one, in its own terms, and the counter-inductive justification of counter-induction is just as strong as the inductive justification of induction. Karl Popper's falsificationist programme was concerned with more than just the problem of induction. Popper saw the problem of induction as a central obstacle to putting science on a rational footing that would distinguish it from non-scientific uses of empirical evidence. One attempt to avoid Goodman's New Riddle is to stipulate that only "non-positional predicates" should be allowed in inductive inferences. The fact that the problem of induction could be developed into a problem about language choice reveals a conceptual connection of the utmost importance: the connection between inductive inference and classification.
