ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on verificationism, which is the theory of meaning associated with the logical positivist movement. Verificationism asserts a strong connection between meaning and experience. Nor need verification be attainable in practice, in order for us to have sufficient grasp of verification conditions to render our utterances meaningful. If the verification principle is not an analytic truth, known a priori, then it must be an empirical claim, and it must be verifiable - if it is meaningful at all. The success of this technique for explaining a priori knowledge and logical necessity depends on there being a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. The relevant distinction here is between analytic and synthetic: a distinction concerning meanings, and thus a semantic distinction. Along with skepticism about meaning, Quine also defends a view about confirmation known as confirmation holism. Both confirmation holism and meaning skepticism are theses that most philosophers prefer to ignore than to engage directly.
