ABSTRACT
The central problem in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation of the mental and the physical. Descartes' argument for substance dualism is open to challenge in a number of respects. The other kind of dualism, and the one endorsed by some contemporary philosophers, is property dualism. Mental and physical properties are born by the same "stuff", on the property dualist view, which might somehow mediate between mental and physical events. The Knowledge Argument concludes that there are non-physical facts. The criticism is an extension of the problem of mental causation that we saw afflicted substance dualism. Jackson embraces exactly this asymmetric view of the causal relationship between mental and physical, and calls it epiphenomenalism. Like dualism, physicalism comes in more than one variety. From a perspective informed by a general knowledge of contemporary science, the "starting position" is probably the Identity Thesis. Behaviorism is the view that mental states are just stimulus-response behavior patterns.
