ABSTRACT
Introduction The signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002 was seen as a signifi cant milestone, as it prescribed a range of confl ict avoidance mechanisms through self-restraint, dialogues and cooperative activities. However, as the implementation of the DOC and work towards a code of conduct faced deadlocks, optimism about fruitful ASEAN multilateralism receded. Beijing’s “charm offensive” helped increase its infl uence across Southeast Asia, basically neutralising ASEAN as a means to constrain China. In the same time, China renewed its maritime assertiveness, using its physical force as well as its economic power to deny Vietnam’s rights to maritime control and resources under UNCLOS. China’s growing economic and military power as well as increased trend of bandwagoning with China in Southeast Asia then created a serious challenge to Hanoi’s foreign policy, which has been primarily centred on bilateralism with China and ASEAN multilateralism. The chapter examines the South China Sea developments and Vietnam’s security predicament in the context of China’s rise in the period 2003-2007.
