ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War the geo-strategic position of South Asian countries has been undergoing major re-evaluation. Strategic postures that were adopted up to the end of the Cold War were based on assumptions that were fundamentally challenged by the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bradnock 1992; Chapman 2009). The Cold War positions of the individual countries of South Asia vis a vis the world’s then-superpowers, reflected the perception of what each saw as its core interests at home. Pakistan viewed the interests of defending itself against possible Indian attack as being strengthened by joining the western-led pacts of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO - see Chapter 1). In contrast, India, not wishing to have its new-found independence compromised by being a subservient partner in any strategic alliance, chose to promote non-alignment. Sri Lanka also supported non-alignment but sought to balance India’s regional power through making overtures to China. At the heart of the security strategies of South Asian countries during the Cold War was the perception by all of India’s neighbours that India itself was not only the giant of South Asia, but, even when bilateral relations were good, the major potential challenge to its own security. In the first two decades of Independence the broad outlines of South Asia’s strategic postures were set in a mould that was only broken by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
