ABSTRACT
Locke’s attitude towards skepticism is puzzling. Locke is clearly aware of skeptical worries about the external world and mentions them nearly every time he discusses knowledge of the external world. One sentence after he first claims that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world, for example, Locke writes: “But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses” (IV.ii.14/537). The basic worry Locke repeatedly acknowledges is that while we certainly know our own ideas, the existence of an idea in our mind need not reveal any external reality because there is no necessary connection between such reality and an idea. Locke’s confidence that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world is thus certainly not due to ignorance of skeptical worries.
