ABSTRACT
World War One presented a paradox. After the initial mobile period, operational manoeuvre had been made impossible by tactical stasis. The great efforts to restore tactical mobility were not, however, accompanied by parallel efforts to restore operational manoeuvre, as shown by the failure to exploit the breakthroughs by the allies at Cambrai and by the Germans in March 1918. As the war ended, efforts were underway to remedy the situation. The war was expected to go on into 1919, and Fuller addressed the issue in his Plan 1919:
The problem was no longer how to break the enemy’s front . . . but, instead, how to maintain continuity of forward movement, in other words, how to effect an unbroken pursuit. As long as the enemy was only punched back, and after each blow was given time to recover, he could always find time to destroy communications - roads and railways - before he withdrew. Without roads and railways the pursuit of a determined enemy was not possible.1
