ABSTRACT
If Buddhist metaphysics grows out of a concern with explaining the nature of reality – such that gaining an insight into this nature leads to the gradual elimination of confusion – Buddhist epistemology provides the methodological foundation for pursuing this pragmatic goal. Two representative figures in particular stand at this defining turn in the development of a systematic theory of knowledge within the Indian Buddhist tradition: Dignāga (ca. 480–540) and Dharmakīrti (ca. seventh century). A pivotal figure in the development of Indian logic and epistemology, Dignāga challenged his contemporaries to justify their reliance on scriptural authority and shifted the focus of subsequent developments in Indian philosophy from a concern with the aims and rules of debate to an investigation of the means by which one may obtain reliable knowledge (pramāṇa). What is remarkable is that he accomplished this task, unlike his predecessors, by engaging his opponents largely on their own terms. His great successor, Dharmakīrti, would correct, defend, and further expand Dignāga’s epistemological project, making original contributions of his own and in many ways surpassing his predecessor. Indeed, Dharmakīrti’s overarching impact on subsequent generations of philosophers in India and beyond is such that he is often taken to represent the standard account of Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. Only Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 ce) – and only much later with the ascendency of Madhyamaka in Tibet – would come to command a more prominent status in the Buddhist philosophical canon.
