ABSTRACT
Earlier chapters have paid relat ively little atten tion to the roles of middle and lower level employ ees of public admin is tra tions. They have presen ted them as working within complex, partially controlled organ isa tions, granted various degrees of discre tion and required to collab or ate with other actors of the policy subsys tem, but there has been no exam in a tion of the implic a tions of their own dispos i tions and motiv a tional struc tures for these situ ations. This chapter explores this issue. In that sense this chapter may be seen as shift ing atten tion from the exam in a tion of bureau cracy in Chapter 12 to the exam in a tion of bureau crats here. First, it exam ines some rather old but still relev ant theory, developed by soci olo gists influ enced by the work of Max Weber, which stresses the way in which work in bureau cratic organ isa tions may involve the selec tion (or the creation) of person al it ies who will be rigid rule follow ers and tend to give more atten tion to the means by which policy is enacted than to its ends. This will then be contras ted with the ‘street level bureau cracy’ perspect ive of Michael Lipsky, with its partic u lar implic a tions for those working with relat ively unrou tin ised service and profes sional roles, which stresses the many ways in which offi cials may actu ally strongly shape or even create policy. This leads on to an exam in a tion of the issues about the roles of profes sion als in public sector bureau cra cies. The chapter finishes with a discus sion of Mashaw’s analysis of issues about profes sional autonomy, a topic which leads towards issues about account ab il ity (which will be examined in Chapter 15).
