ABSTRACT

Let us now turn to consider the processes of affective organization in man in the light of what we have learnt of such processes in animals. In animals they go but a little way to modify innate organization; in man they result in acquired organization of great complexity, in a vast system of acquired but enduring likings and dislikings, sympathies and antipathies, respects and contempts, admirations and scorns, friendships and enmities, loves and hates. All such instances of acquired affective organization fall into one or other of two classes, sentiments and tastes. 1 In the foregoing chapter we saw how, in the highest animals, such as the domesticated dog, affective organization may reach a point that almost justifies the application of the word ‘sentiment’; as in the case of a dog’s enduring devotion to his master. But it is only in the human species that such organization reaches a point that fully justifies the use of this word. Let us consider its usage more nearly.