ABSTRACT
To many of his colleagues, Theodore Sarbin's position, that hypnotic behavior can be thought of as a form of role enactment, appears to be an elaborate and futile exercise in linguistic philosophy. Sarbin has a keen grasp of the philosophy of science, and to such colleagues he appears to be excessively addicted to a facile logic, in which substance is secondary to style. The problem is compounded further by the fact that Sarbin sees a variety of psychopathologies (such as schizophrenia and depression) in similar role-enactment terms. Even more confusing, to some, is Sarbin's insistence that all theories in science are metaphors, including his own. Along with this insistence is an emphasis that theories as metaphors run the distinct risk of becoming reified, particularly if theory, conceived of in this way, is taken literally rather than as an "as-if" statement. Sarbin's theory is thus sometimes seen as an act of willful perversity for his advocacy of a role-enactment theory of hypnosis (which carries connotations of sham behavior), for his belief that all theories are metaphors, and for his recognition of the limitations of the role metaphor as theory. It is strange that this should confuse so many people, since the view that theories in science constitute convenient fictions or best guesses at the truth for want of more factual data has a long and honorable history in the philosophy of science, (Sarbin & Anderson, 1967). To say that all theories are metaphors, including one's own, is simply to subscribe to a common, and tenable belief.
