ABSTRACT
During the last half-century, a transformation of governance has taken place in Europe. States, executives, and parliaments have empowered a growing number of so-called non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs)3 to make public policies. At the national level, many independent regulatory bodies have been established to make new rules or apply existing ones to new situations in many fields of utility regulation, such as telecommunications, antitrust and media pluralism (Weale 2011). At the national and supranational levels, central banks that set monetary policies are insulated from direct political control. In the EU, the
1. INTRODUCTION
After the establishment of the first two European Union agencies (EUAs) in the mid-1970s, many others have followed, especially since the second half of the 1990s. Now, in 2014, there are 35 EUAs at work (excluding EURATOM and executive agencies), with headquarters located all across Europe.1 This massive proliferation of EUAs, not only in number but also in scope and tasks, is attracting increasing academic attention. A particular focus is the question of their legitimacy and accountability. This question is mostly assessed with regard to relations between EUAs and other European Union (EU) institutions – e.g., the Council, European Parliament (EP), European Commission and European Court of Justice (ECJ). In contrast, adopting a ‘demoi-cratic’
