ABSTRACT
In the first place the motives involved are fundament ally egoistic, although, as we saw, they may in certain cases be leavened with the altruistic impulse. Secondly, the approval and disapproval of our social circle cease to be effective sanctions of right conduct, as soon as we can be quite sure that our lapse from the standard demanded of us will never be known to those in whose minds we habitually see ourselves reflected and to whose approval and disapproval we attach importance ; or, in other words, the man whose right conduct rests on no higher basis than this sanction will not conform to the accepted code, in spite of opposing desires, when he is in no danger of being “ found out.” In order to remedy this defect of the sanction of public opinion, many peoples have supple mented it with the doctrine of an all-seeing eye, of a power that can observe all men’s deeds, however carefully con cealed, and will distribute rewards and punishments either in this life or another, according as these deeds conform to, or transgress, the current code of society. This supplementary sanction has, no doubt, proved very effective at a certain stage of the moral evolution of societies. But it must be recognised that the motives to which this sanction appeals are lower than the motives through which public opinion affects conduct; for it
commonly relies upon rewards and punishments of a lower type than public approval and disapproval. Fur ther, since the rewards offered and the punishments threatened are generally extremely remote in time and of uncertain character, and since some uncertainty as to their advent is apt to prevail, they have to be described as of very great magnitude if they are to be effective sanctions of conduct; and the promise of disproportion ately large rewards or punishments is in itself demora lising.
