ABSTRACT
We saw in the last chapter that the concept of origination is central to libertarian free will and that origination requires some sort of lack of determinism in the decision-making process. Traditionally, libertarians have argued that indeterminism alone is not sucient to enable free will, for then we would have to equate free will with randomness, which would be as unacceptable as equating it with determinism. Consider the following scenario imagined by the physicist Paul Davies:
If electrodes were planted in your brain and triggered at random by an external source, you would regard that form of interference as a reduction of your freedom: someone “taking over”, or at least impeding, the operation of your brain. How can random quantum quirks inside your head represent anything other than “noise”? You decide to raise your arm, the neurons re in the correct sequence, but a quantum uctuation disturbs the signal. Your leg moves instead. Is that freedom?
