ABSTRACT
This chapter explains Czech involvement in Afghanistan’s post-war reconstruction. The main consideration is the applicability of the notion of strategic narrative. As this volume shows (see Freedman, this volume), the concept has been gaining popularity in contemporary security analysis. As allied statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan have more and more resembled a war of attrition, political necessity to justify those unpopular activities has grown. Weary publics have been targeted by less or more sophisticated narratives explaining why their governments have participated in something that distant: or even ephemeral? Many commentators have been openly talking about information warfare in this context. The tenuous line between what NATO has called “strategic communication” and propaganda has become ever fuzzier, as suggested by one of NATO’s top officials to the author during personal communication (Prague, January 11, 2012). Political interpretations of supposedly impartial security reports have varied greatly, both in time and space. Strategic narratives have, once again, assumed the central position. The Ivory Tower has not lagged much behind. Academic analyses have focused on identification of such narratives and attempted to discern regularities in their functioning. They sometimes even made normative cases for their construction. This chapter falls into the first category. The subject is approached as follows. First, conceptual and empirical specificity of the Czech case is outlined and implications discussed. Attention will be paid to a leader-follower relationship between the Czech Republic and the United States. This normative bond has served as the referential framework for the Czech governmental elite to make security-policy decisions, including those aimed at Afghanistan’s reconstruction. A brief overview of Czech activities in Afghanistan is featured. Second, qualities of the Czech strategic narrative are outlined. And they are compared to expectations of the general literature. This is seen as a vital, inductively laden process needed for positive heuristics of the concept. Finally, possible limits of strategic narratives are demonstrated on the Czech case. This is being
done through two moves: an analysis of public opinion is present and elite political contestation of the country’s involvement in Afghanistan is discussed. It shows the disconnection between the decision-making process and popular beliefs, as well as between the government and political opposition. This is used to refute a popular belief that the only reason why allied states endured with support of utterly unpopular mission has been given by the presence of domestic political consensus (cf. Kreps 2010).
