ABSTRACT
In this chapter we re-examine what 3- to 5-year-olds may or may not understand about the mind. We begin by examining a dilemma that has arisen among studies of 3-year-olds’ ability to attribute false belief to others. To anticipate, we conclude that evidence that 3-year-olds are able to pass certain modified tests of false belief can be explained without having to assume that they understand the representational nature of mental states. Instead we argue that it is only necessary to assume that 3-year-olds (1) represent people as thinking about things and as either knowing or not knowing the true state of affairs, and (2) project their own feelings of knowing onto others in reasoning about what others know. We also argue that previous research may have overestimated 4-and 5-year-olds’ understanding because traditional tests of false belief allow children to answer correctly by reasoning only about absence or presence of knowledge in themselves and others. Our alternative explanations of 3- to 5-year-olds’ understanding of mental states are based on studies suggesting what younger children already know about the mind, and on studies suggesting what older children still have to learn.
