ABSTRACT
It is often supposed that one function of consciousness, or at least the function of one aspect of consciousness (which Block, 1995, refers to as “access consciousness”), is to permit the use of representations to control action. This supposition makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint (because it grants consciousness direct consequences for behaviour), but it is also buoyed by a fair bit of empirical support. Action control (including, in human beings beyond a certain age, control of speech) is indeed a key behavioural correlate of representations that are likely conscious. Of course, insofar as we rely on verbal report in order to determine whether or not a representation is conscious, then it would seem that consciousness is actually defined as having the function of control (at least the control of speech). However, we escape from this circle of definition when we ask about the relation between the reportability of a representation and the extent to which that representation can be used to control actions other than speech. The question, then, becomes one of specifying the conditions under which complete versus partial access obtains (i.e. access to both action and speech vs. access to speech alone), and providing an account of consciousness that explains why only partial access occurs under certain conditions.
