ABSTRACT
One of the central debates within the recent history of cognitive science has concerned the nature of cognitive representations: Can they be identified as discrete and invariant elements within the cognitive system, or are they inextricably intertwined with one another, and with the processes in which they are used? Kinsbourne and Hobson offered views about consciousness that suggest a similar debate. Put simply: Can consciousness be usefully identified with a distinguishable subcomponent of the system in which it arises, or does it necessarily involve interactions among all (or an arbitrarily varying subset of) components? Of course, this debate raises a number of important associated questions (e.g., what do we mean by “distinguishable subcomponent,” and where do we draw the line regarding the involvement of others). Some of these questions are vexing, and neither Hobson nor Kinsbourne presume to answer all of them in detail. Nevertheless, each touches on issues that are central to any understanding of consciousness and, at least on the surface, their points of view appear to diverge. Kinsbourne argues for what he called the heterarchical, or highly distributed nature of consciousness, whereas Hobson focuses on the importance of structured hierarchies, at both the neurobiological and cognitive levels. This chapter suggests that, in fact, their views are quite compatible, and even complement one another. First however, it is useful to review each perspective.
