ABSTRACT
My aim is not so much to derive a cognitive theory of time as to arrive at a temporal theory of cognition. Consider the following limerick, as quoted by Narlikar (1978):
Human mental activities, including human cognition, depend on temporal direction. As Denbigh (1981) stated, it is difficult to conceptualize unknowing or unobserving in conjunction with knowing or observing. Miss Bright is confined to science fiction, to theoretical physics, or to the realm of insanity. In short, if one is neither a novelist nor a theoretical physicist, one risks the chance of being regarded as insane by addressing the issue of time reversal in cognition. However, it is also possible that time reversal may, in fact, be a fundamental process underlying phenomena that appear to be illogical, irrational, delusionary, or insane. For example, if one claims to have a power of precognition to receive a message before it is sent, such a claim is often regarded as delusionary, and tends to be condemned to the normative realm of abnormality or paranormality. However, the end-means relationship is
as pertinent to animal evolution as the cause-effect relationship. Human cognition, as a part of evolutionary process, is capable of anticipating, expecting, and axiomatizing before receiving information. In short, cognition is capable of incorporating some kind of time reversal. At least, if cognition is to be understood, the issue of insanity must be studied without resorting to normative criteria.
