ABSTRACT
Let it be once more called to mind that the distinction between the formal and the material modes of speech does not refer to genuine object-sentences and therefore not to the sentences of the empirical sciences, or to sentences of this kind which occur in the discussions of the logic of science (or of philosophy). (See the three columns, on p. 286.) It is here a question of the sentences of the proper logic of science. According to the ordinary use of language it is customary to formulate these partly in the form of logical sentences and partly in the form of object-sentences. Our investigations have shown that the supposititious object-sentences of the logic of science are pseudo-object-sentences, or sentences which apparently speak about objects, like the real object-sen tences, but which in reality are speaking about the designations of these objects. This implies that all the sentences of the logic of science are logical sentences; that is to say, sentences about lan guage and linguistic expressions. And our investigations have further shown that all these sentences can be formulated in such a way as to refer not to sense and meaning but to the syntactical form of the sentences and other expressions-they can all be translated into the formal mode of speech, or, in other words, into syntactical sentences. The logic of science is the syntax of the language of science.
