ABSTRACT
the present essay is an attempt to develop a systematic exposition of that part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (in his “Tractarian” period, 1913–1919) which is commonly known as his account of “the mystical”. Not that I believe that this part of the Tractarian philosophy is to any extent “mystical”, or that it can be separated from the main part of the philosophy of the Tractatus. As a matter of fact I shall try to prove that this is not the case: the philosophy of “the mystical” is an integral part of the Tractatus, and thus it presupposes a detailed and thorough understanding of the preceding parts of the work. I shall try to show, in the following pages, that what Wittgenstein says about “the mystical” depends heavily on what he says about facts, objects, logic and language; that any interpretation which brings in “mystical”, alien doctrines and concepts to clarify Wittgenstein’s intentions totally misses the mark.
